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Kumar was taken hostage and forced to pay his own ransom by the Tamil
Tigers in Sri Lanka. When he arrived in the United States, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) jailed Kumar for nearly thirty months, contending
that his ransom payment constituted "material support" for terrorism under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). Now, more than five years after his arrival,
his asylum claim is still pending.
Louis was threatened with death and robbed of four dollars and a sack lunch
by a Burundi rebel group. After landing at Dulles Airport, DHS detained
Louis for more than twenty months, arguing that these robberies constituted
"material support" for terrorism. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
finally granted him asylum, reversing the decision of an immigration judge.
Gilmer was forced by armed insurgents in El Salvador to move unmarked
boxes. Gilmer successfully defended a challenge to an immigration judge's
decision to grant his release on bond over the objection of DHS.
Kumar, Louis, and Gilmer are my clients. Each man qualifies for refugee
protection, has never committed a crime, and presents no danger to the United
States. Nonetheless, their cases have been some of the most difficult of my
twelve-year career representing asylum seekers. This Essay discusses the
unique challenges of representing clients who have been accused of providing
"material support" for terrorism, despite the fact that they are undisputedly
victims of terrorism. Like they have done with so many other immigration
laws, DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have interpreted the material-
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worked on cases and issues involving material support for terrorism for nearly four years. He is
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support bar to admissibility (and thus to asylum and other refugee relief) so
broadly that Congress's clear intent-to keep financers and supporters of
terrorism from entering the United States-has been entirely lost in the
provision's enforcement. The inability of the U.S. immigration system to
distinguish between terrorism's victims and actual terrorists not only disserves
refugees, but also calls into question the system's efficacy in identifying those
who threaten our national security.
The purpose of this Essay is to provide guidance to lawyers representing
asylum seekers potentially affected by the material-support bar. The Essay
begins with a brief history of the material-support bar to admissibility, and then
discusses how DHS and DOJ have expanded the statutory language to include
thousands of terrorism victims. The next section presents the challenges faced
by lawyers representing these clients, and suggests strategies for approaching
these cases at various stages.
I. TRADITIONAL BARS TO ASYLUM: EXCLUDING PERSECUTORS AND THOSE
WHO ARE DANGEROUS
Practitioners representing asylum seekers must now vigilantly explore any
potential basis for application of the material-support bar. Traditionally, my
colleagues and I would ask our clients about the broad topics of potential
ineligibility, including criminal activity and persecution of others. Refugee
law has long recognized that those individuals who present a danger to the host
country, those who have engaged in serious non-political crimes, and those
who have persecuted others must be excluded from protection. The Refugee
Convention of 1951 requires that these individuals, even if facing persecution,
be excluded from protection.' U.S. law, incorporating the Refugee Convention
after the United States acceded to the Refugee Convention's 1967 Protocol,
specifically bars from refugee protection (that is, protection through asylum or
withholding removal) those who participate in the persecution of others; those
who commit serious non-political crimes abroad or are convicted of
particularly serious crimes in the United States; and those who engage in
terrorism, are representatives of terrorist groups, or otherwise pose a threat to
national security.
2
Under both U.S. and international law, bars to refugee relief are thus
predicated on the personal culpability of the actor and the risk to the nation in
1. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I(F), July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6263, 189 U.N.T.S. 156; U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(2),
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 268.
2. Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) § 208(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(h)(2) (2006);
I.N.A. § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(b)(3)(B) (2006); see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DENIAL AND
DELAY: THE IMPACT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAW'S "TERRORISM BARS" ON ASYLUM SEEKERS
AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 15-16 (2009) [hereinafter DENIAL AND DELAY],
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdfIRPP-DenialandDelay-FULL- I 1009-web.pdf.
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which the individual is seeking protection. 3 Unfortunately, this touchstone has
been forgotten almost entirely in the application of the material-support bar.4
A recent report by Human Rights First, a non-governmental organization,
describes in detail the development of the relevant statutory provisions and
their interpretation, calling this twenty-year journey "the road to absurdity," 5
an apt description considering how DHS and the BIA have interpreted the
statute broadly to encompass asylum seekers who have been victimized by or
have had only incidental contact with members of armed groups.
Put briefly, the U.S. statutory provisions establishing eligibility for asylum
contain exclusions consistent with international law, including a provision that
requires the denial of an application by an individual who has "engaged in a
terrorist activity" as that phrase is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i). 6
"Terrorist activity" has been defined since the Immigration Act of 1990 as
any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is
committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United States,
would be unlawful under the laws of the United states or any State)
and which involves ... [t]he use of any ... explosive, firearm, or
other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal
monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the
safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to
property.
7
At the same time, within the definition of "engage in terrorist activity,"
Congress included providing material support, defined as "commit[ting] an act
that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support,
including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of
funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification,
weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives,
or training . .. 8
Both of these terrorism provisions were made bars to asylum and other
refugee relief in 1996 when Congress expanded the list of bars to all forms of
refugee protection,9 specifically including an exclusion for "engag[ing] in
3. DENIAL AND DELAY, supra note 2.
4. Id. at 16-17.
5. Id. at 19-22.
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v) (2006); I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)
(i) (2006).
7. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5069-70 (1990)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(VI) (2006)).
8. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(VI) (2006).
9. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 604, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 690-91 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1158(h)(2)(A)(V) (2006)).
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terrorist activity."' 1 Despite this statutory revision, for the next several years,
neither fighters who battled military forces nor asylum seekers who had been
victimized by terrorist groups were barred from asylum in the United States."
The major statutory change that has led to today's morass for victims of
terrorism came via the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which created a new
category of "terrorist organizations" to include any "group of two or more
individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup
which engages in" terrorist activity as defined in 8 U.S.C. §
1 182(a)(3)(B)(iv).12 This new so-called "Tier III" designation created, for the
first time, a U.S. statutory definition of "terrorist organization" beyond those
groups formally listed by the U.S. government. 13 Providing material support to
one of these unlisted Tier III organizations-interpreted to include any group
that uses violence against persons or property for any purpose, no matter how
justifiable, unless solely for monetary gain-or simply to one of its members
or subgroups thus became a bar to asylum. 14 The statute's only exception for
support of a Tier III organization (as opposed to the listed Tier I and Tier II
organizations) is a demonstration by "clear and convincing evidence" that the
person providing material support "did not know, and should not reasonably
have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization. ' 5 With no
agency guidance, the definition of what constitutes a Tier III organization has
been left to individual immigration judges, asylum officers, and other
adjudicators.
Despite multiple laws adding to the statutory framework, virtually no
legislative history exists to indicate the intent of Congress when the statute is
applied to asylum seekers. 16  In this vacuum, DHS interprets the statute
10. IIRIRA § 604,8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(B) (2006).
11. See DENIAL AND DELAY, supra note 2, at 20. The material-support statute is also a bar
to admissibility into the United States, meaning that it can preclude, for example, an individual's
attempt to enter the United States as a refugee or to adjust status in the United States-such as an
asylee attempting to become a legal permanent resident, or a legal permanent resident seeking to
naturalize. This Essay focuses specifically on the application of the bar to those seeking refugee
protection in the United States.
12. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(Ill)
(2006).
13. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 41 1(a)(l)(G), 115 Stat. 272, 347 (2001)
(codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (2006)); OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2001 REPORT ON FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS (Oct. 5, 2001), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/5258.htm.
14. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C. § I182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (defining "material
support").
15. 8 U.S.C. § I1 82(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (2006).
16. See, e.g., In re S- K- , 23 1. & N. Dec. 936, 943 (B.I.A. 2006) ("We are unaware
of any legislative history which indicates a limitation on the definition of the term 'material
support."').
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broadly, losing all connection between the material-support bar and threats to
national security or dangers to the community. By taking advantage of the
lack of legislative history, DHS's overbroad interpretations harm the statutory
scheme created by Congress. The term "material support" follows the
definition of "engage in a terrorist activity," one of several enumerated
grounds of inadmissibility set forth under the subheading "Security and
Related Grounds.' 7  Among the other security-related bases for
inadmissibility under that subparagraph are membership in a terrorist
organization; 8 proposed activities that "would have potentially serious adverse
foreign policy consequences for the United States";' 9 membership in a
totalitarian party; and association with a terrorist organization with the
intention to engage in activities "that could endanger the welfare, safety, or
security of the United States.,, 2 1 Each of those provisions is directed toward
protecting the national security and foreign policy of the United States by
excluding aliens who may pose a threat to those interests.
The material-support statute does include a "safety valve" that allows the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Attorney
General, after consultation with the other two cabinet-level officials, not to
apply the material-support ground of inadmissibility upon a finding in his "sole
unreviewable discretion, that [the material-support] clause [should] not
apply.",22  In 2007, the DHS Secretary announced specific exercises of his
waiver authority, allowing officials within DHS to grant waivers for persons
subject to the material-support bar, such as those who donated to certain Tier
23 . 24III "terrorist" groups and victims of terrorist coercion.  DHS has interpreted
its waiver authority to require it to subject any waiver applications to two
levels of review; it also reserves the right to review any case at headquarters,
25
17. See I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3).
18. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(V), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V).
19. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(3)(C)(i).
20. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(3)(D).
21. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(F), 8 U.S.C. § I1 82(a)(3)(F).
22. I.N.A. § 212(d)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(3)(B)(i). This waiver provision was added
in 2005 by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 101(b), 103-104, 119 Stat. 231,
303, 306-09.
23. Press Release, Statement by Homeland Sec. Sec'y Michael Chertoff on the Intention to
Use Discretionary Authority for Material Support to Terrorism (Jan. 19, 2007),
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr._ 169465766808.shtm. Those groups included the Karen
National Union and Karen National Liberation Army, Chin National Front and Chin National
Army, Chin National League for Democracy, Kayan New Land Party, Arakan Liberation Party,
Tibetan Mustangs, Cuban Alzados, and Karenni National Progressive Party. Id
24. Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 26,138, 26,138 (May 8, 2007).
25. Memorandum from Jonathan Scharfen, Deputy Director, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs. to Assoc. Dirs., Chief, Office of Admin. Appeals, Chief Counsel, Processing
the Discretionary Exemption to the Inadmissibility Ground for Providing Material Support to
2010]
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resulting in an unworkable bottleneck and statutory interpretations that may be
entirely unreviewable by federal courts.
The delays in the waiver process have been particularly pronounced for
those asylum seekers whose cases are litigated in immigration court.2' DHS
policy, announced in October 2008, requires that before a waiver application
will be considered, immigration court proceedings must be "final"-that is, all
administrative appeals must have been exhausted, even if there is no dispute
about the grounds for waiver eligibility.2 7 For Kumar, for example, this policy
meant that his waiver application, submitted in May 2007, had not been
adjudicated as of July 2010 because his case was not considered
administratively final until February 2010.
More troubling, the waiver provision provides an easy way for DHS trial
attorneys and the BIA to justify their overbroad interpretations by pointing to
this putative escape-hatch. The BIA, in its only published decision on the issue
of material support, Matter of S-K-, justified its determination that the
statute must bar the asylum application of a woman who donated money to the
Chin National Front-a Burmese organization that defends the Chin minority
against the repressive Burmese regime-by pointing to the waiver provision,
stating that "Congress attempted to balance the harsh provisions set forth in the
Act with a waiver."
28
Kumar, Louis, and Gilmer are hardly the only asylum seekers caught in this
overbroad interpretation of the material-support bar and the government's
failure to establish a workable waiver process. Human Rights First has
catalogued the victims of the material-support bar for several years. These
include:
0 A Columbian nurse whose life was threatened after she was forced
at gunpoint by the Fuerzas Armadas Revoluciaonaries de Columbia
(FARC), a guerrilla group, to provide medical care to injured FARC
members; 2
9
Certain Terrorist Organizations 9 (May 24, 2009), available at http://www.USCIS.gov/files/
pressrelease/MaterialSupport_24May07.pdf.
26. DENIAL AND DELAY, supra note 2, at 8.
27. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Fact Sheet: Department of Homeland
Security Implements Exemption Authority for Certain Terrorist-Related Inadmissibility Grounds
for Cases with Administratively Final Orders of Removal (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.uscis.gov
/files/article/FACT0/o20SHEET%20DHS%20Exemption%20Authority/2020081023.pdf.
28. In re S- K- , 23 1. & N. Dec. 936, 941 (B.I.A. 2006). The BIA has refused to
publish its other decisions on material support, including those involving both Kumar and Louis.
This has allowed DHS attorneys to advance, and immigration judges to accept, interpretations
that the BIA has already rejected.
29. DENIAL AND DELAY, supra note 2, at 23 (citing The "Material[-JSupport" Bar:
Denying Refuge to the Persecuted? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 23-24 (2007) (statement of "Mariana," Columbian
Refugee)).
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" A Christian missionary worker who donated to an armed group that
resisted the Burmese regime that had detained and beat him;
30
" A Nepalese journalist who had been beaten and extorted by Maoist
rebels; 31 and
" A Burmese teacher jailed by the Burmese military after permitting
men connected to a resistance group to stay at her home and
advocate for democracy in her classroom.
32
1I. THE CHALLENGES FOR PRACTITIONERS
Given the paucity of judicial precedent, the absence of regulatory guidance,
the apparent ability of both DHS trial attorneys and asylum officers to define
statutory terms broadly, and a lengthy and opaque waiver process, the material-
support bar presents many challenges for practitioners well beyond those
encountered in the typical asylum case. These challenges include
determining any potential connection between the client and an armed group
(even a distant familial connection); evaluating whether, when, and how to
disclose such a connection; developing legal arguments to persuade the
immigration judge or asylum officer that the material-support bar is
inapplicable; and creating a record that will support both a finding of eligibility
for asylum and a waiver request, and subsequently navigating the waiver
process if the material-support bar is applied in a final judgment. For clients
who are detained, representation may also include efforts to secure release,
either through bond, parole, or habeas corpus relief.
One of the first questions I now ask any new asylum client is whether she
has ever had contact with anyone who has belonged to a group that has even
once engaged in any violent act. Because this is an impossibly broad
question-particularly for the many refugees fleeing countries embroiled in
armed conflict-I follow it with multiple questions to help the client determine
whether she has had any connection to a group that an asylum officer, DHS
trial attorney, or immigration judge could choose to define as a "terrorist"
30. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED: VICTIMS OF TERRORISM AND
OPPRESSION BARRED FROM ASYLUM 2 (2006) [hereinafter ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED],
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06925-asy-abandon-persecuted.pdf.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Unfortunately, given the breathtaking scope of the agencies' statutory interpretation,
cases possibly implicating the material-support bar are rapidly becoming the norm. See, e.g., In
re L- H- , No. A- 399 (B.I.A. July 10, 2009) (on file with author) (disagreeing
with a determination by an immigration judge that an alien who, while under duress, provided
lunch and approximately four dollars in cash to terrorists had provided material support); In re
S- K- , 23 1. & N. Dec. 936, 945-46 (B.I.A. 2006) (affirming the decision of an
immigration judge that an alien who contributed "approximately one-eighth of her monthly
income" to the Chin National Front for eleven months provided material support).
2010]
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organization under the statute. A discussion with my client about groups that
could be categorized as terrorist organizations is just a start; I must also
research the existence and history of all armed groups in my client's home
country.
Once I discover a possible connection, I must explore the facts with my
client. Unfortunately, when it comes to the application of the material-support
bar, almost no relationship seems too attenuated. The meal she served to her
brother's friend who ate dinner at her house one evening years ago could form
the basis for application of the material-support bar if that friend belonged to a
group that used violence or was simply a peaceful group affiliated with a
violent group. Ironically, in many cases establishing the relationship between
an armed group and the client is not difficult: the very reason many asylum
seekers, including Kumar, Louis, and Gilmer, flee to the United States is to
resist and escape threats by these groups. Their involuntary connections to
these groups-a ransom payment, a stolen lunch, forced labor-are central to
their stories of past persecution, but sadly can lead to their exclusion under the
material-support bar.
Assuming the client has not already told the U.S. govemment of a
connection to a "terrorist" group,34 the next challenge is deciding whether to
disclose the relationship affirmatively. In some situations, the asylum
application form itself, Form 1-589, will compel disclosure, particularly with
Part B, Question 3.A, which asks whether the applicant or any
family members [have] ever belonged to or been associated with any
organizations or groups in [their] home country, such as, but not
limited to, a political party, student group, labor union, religious
organization, military or paramilitary group, civil patrol, guerrilla
organization, ethnic group, human rights group, or the press or
media[ .... ]35
Form 1-589, however, does not contain any questions specifically addressing
material support;36 thus the disclosure of any connections to a terrorist group
that do not either form the basis of the asylum claim, like Kumar's, or involve
familial relationships will not necessarily be required in the asylum
application.
34. Arriving asylum seekers like Kumar and Louis are given credible fear interviews by
DHS, typically before they have been able to secure lawyers. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d) (2009)
(outlining the procedure for a credible fear interview); id. § 235.3(b)(4) (2009) (providing for
credible fear interviews for aliens in removal proceedings).
35. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OMB No. 1615-0037, 1-589, APPLICATION
FOR ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL (2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
files/form/i-589.pdf.
36. See id.
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If disclosure is not mandated by the 1-589, and is not integral to the client's
story, the client and lawyer may be faced with a difficult strategic choice:
Should the client disclose that he may have provided material support and risk
possible application of the bar, or hope that the asylum officer, DHS trial
attorney, or immigration judge never asks a question that unveils the
connection? This dilemma is more complicated than the typical litigator's
choice of whether to disclose "bad facts" affirmatively or wait for cross-
examination. Affirmative disclosure of the facts underlying possible material
support could be viewed as a concession that the bar applies, putting the
client's entitlement to refugee status in jeopardy, and making a waiver the only
option for relief, a risky proposition for a process with an uncertain timeline
and outcome, and without possibility of judicial review.37 On the other hand,
failure to disclose these facts, even if not relevant to the asylum claim, could
put any possible waiver at risk. DHS has made clear that one factor in a
waiver request is whether the applicant "[h]as fully disclosed, in all relevant
applications and interviews with [the] U.S. Government ... the nature and
circumstances of each provision of such material support."
38
Consider, for example, a Darfuri client from Sudan who fled to the United
States without her young children, leaving them in the care of her mother. She
has no personal or familial connections to the various armed resistance
movements defending against the Janjaweed; thus her asylum application
contains no information indicating that she may have provided material
support to a "terrorist" organization. In the attorney's discussions with her,
however, she recalls a story of one night when she allowed three men with
guns to sleep in her tent. She made them each a bowl of rice. She does not
know anything else about these men and did not witness any fighting. This
incident has no relevance to her persecution by the Janjaweed, and is thus
unlikely to come up when she recounts her story to an asylum officer. Nor is it
clear that the asylum officer will ask any questions that would require her to
disclose this incident.
In this case, disclosing this incident would require a strong argument that the
three bowls of rice did not constitute "material support," or that the client can
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that she did not know these men
37. See Melanie Nezer, The "Material Support" Problem: An Uncertain Future for
Thousands of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 10 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1849, 1849 (2005),
available at http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/ms-rptresearch-artbender5-12-05.pdf ("[Slome
500 asylum seekers with legitimate claims whose cases are complicated by material support
issues are 'on hold' and waiting for final decisions on their cases."); REFUGEE COUNCIL USA,
THE MATERIAL SUPPORT PROBLEM: PUNISHING REFUGEE VICTIMS OF TERROR: MARCH 8, 2007
(2007), available at http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/ms-backgrd-info3-8-07.pdf (explaining
that, of seven thousand asylum cases on hold, only ten to twenty cases will be granted waivers).
38. Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 26,138 (May 8, 2007).
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belonged to a "terrorist group." Given the track record of DHS, it is likely that
only the sympathy of the asylum officer will prevent her case from being sent
to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) headquarters for
consideration and, consequently, lengthy delay. As long as her asylum
application is pending, she will be unable to bring her children to the United
States, even as they remain in grave danger in Darfur. Non-disclosure,
however, could result in a denial of her waiver request, if waiver were
available.
Ultimately, the choice of whether and when to disclose possible material
support will depend on the facts of each case, but in any event a practitioner
must be prepared with all arguments, both legal and factual, to persuade the
asylum officer or immigration judge that the material-support bar does not
apply. The good news and bad news for lawyers is that the field is quite open.
The BIA's sole published decision on the issue, In re S- K-, stands
simply for the principles that the motivations of the group to which the asylum
applicant provided material support are irrelevant and that the applicant need
not intend to support violent activity for the bar to apply.39 Neither the BIA
nor any federal appellate court has issued a published decision addressing
questions such as whether the support must be more than de minimis, whether
the statute encompasses those who are robbed or who provided "support"
under duress, or whether certain types of non-monetary assistance (such as
medical care, meals, washing clothes, and other routine forms of hospitality)
can be considered material support when provided to a member of a "terrorist"
group but without direct connection to any terrorist activity. This area of the
law accordingly invites creative legal arguments, particularly in cases where
the denial of refugee status serves no equitable purpose.
The case of Louis is a good example of the opportunity to develop legal
arguments in this arena. When my colleagues and I took the case on appeal to
the BIA, we were required to fashion arguments based on the statutory text to
overturn an immigration judge's decision that the robbery of a sack lunch and
four dollars and twelve cents constituted material support. Louis had been
repeatedly threatened by the FNL, a Hutu rebel group in Burundi. On one
occasion, FNL members stopped a bus, known as a "bush taxi," on which he
was a passenger and took the bus passengers' lunches. When Louis was
stopped another time by FNL members demanding he make a membership
payment, one of the rebels noticed bills in his shirt pocket. The man took the
bills from Louis, which amounted to about four dollars and twelve cents, and
told him that this would not be considered membership dues, which he should
pay if he did not want to be killed the next time the rebels saw him. Louis told
39. In re S- K- , 23 1. & N. Dec. 936, 940, 943 (B.I.A. 2006). The BIA has issued a
number of unpublished decisions addressing the material-support bar, including the decisions in
the cases of Kumar, Louis, and Gilmer, but these can be accessed only by unofficial channels and
of course are not binding on the agencies.
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the FNL members to buy themselves some beers with the money they took,
and promised to pay membership dues soon. He fled to the United States
shortly thereafter.
Our primary argument on appeal focused on the statutory text, which
requires that an individual "commit an act" that provides "material support.
' 4 °
We also contended that the word "material" must be given independent
content, meaning important or "significant," as defined by the dictionary4 1 and
various federal statutes and regulations. 42  The BIA agreed with both
arguments and overturned the immigration judge's decision in an unpublished
S• 43
opinion.
Fortunately, it did not take long for Louis to receive a final order granting
his asylum application because the immigration judge had already determined
that he was otherwise eligible for asylum. Not every asylum seeker is so
lucky; many practitioners and immigration judges do not understand that it is
critical to obtain a specific ruling on the client's eligibility for asylum
independent of a determination of whether the material-support bar applies to
the asylum seeker. Without such a ruling, subsequent proceedings will be
necessary either if the material-support bar is later determined to be
inapplicable, as in Louis's case, or the client seeks a waiver of the bar from
DHS, which is conditioned on a showing of eligibility for an immigration
benefit.44 Accordingly, any initial immigration court decision should include
specific and separate findings on the applicant's eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal, as would be found in any decision on asylum or other
refugee relief. Practitioners therefore must be prepared to demand that the
immigration judge make a ruling on eligibility for asylum "but for" the
40. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2006).
41. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 765 (11th ed. 2003) (defining
material as "of or relating to the subject matter of reasoning" and "having real importance or great
consequences"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "material" as "[o]f
such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person's decision-making; significant;
essential").
42. See e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771(a)(2) (2006) (imposing civil
liability on those who make false statements concerning a material fact in registration statements
or with regard to the sale of securities); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78i(a)(4) (2000) (forbidding manipulation of security prices by statements "false or misleading
with respect to any material fact"); cf FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (implying that, for purposes of a motion
for summary judgment, an issue of fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case
under the applicable substantive law); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ("[T]he
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment ... ").
43. In re L- H- , No. A- 399 (B.I.A. July 10, 2009) (on file with author).
Our request for publication was denied by the BIA.
44. See Exercise of Authority Under Sec. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 26,138, 26,138 (May 8, 2007) (notice of determination).
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material-support bar, even when the asylum seeker is found ineligible for relief
because of the bar.
Kumar's is a tragic case-in-point. In 2005, when Kumar was represented by
other counsel in his initial immigration court proceedings, the immigration
court simply denied his asylum application on the grounds that Kumar's five-
hundred-dollar ransom payment to his Tamil Tiger captors constituted
"material support" without ever considering the merits of his underlying
asylum claim. More than two years later, the BIA finally acted on his appeal,
rejecting his argument that his coerced payment could not be considered
"support" for terrorism. The BIA remanded his case to the immigration court
for a determination of whether he was otherwise eligible for asilum and thus
could qualify for a waiver from DHS on the ground of duress. His second
immigration court merits hearing was held in 2008. This time, the immigration
court determined that Kumar was indeed eligible for asylum but for the
material-support bar; a subsequent appeal to the BIA was not decided until
2009.
Kumar's waiver request to DHS is still pending in 2010, more than five
years after he entered the United States and nearly three years after his first
waiver application, which was filed immediately following the announcement
of DHS waiver authority in cases of duress. In all this time since he told his
story to DHS in his credible fear interview, the material facts supporting his
requests for asylum and a waiver have not changed. Meanwhile, Kumar
remains separated from his wife, whom he cannot bring to the United States
until he obtains asylum status.
Detention presents another challenge for practitioners representing asylum
seekers precluded by the material-support bar because the statutory
categorization of material support as "terrorist activity" may be considered by
DHS to be grounds to refuse release. Detention, which makes the
representation of any immigration client difficult,46 is often prolonged for
asylum seekers in proceedings involving the material-support bar. Kumar was
jailed in Elizabeth, New Jersey for nearly thirty months; Louis was detained in
several jails in Virginia over a twenty-month period. DHS rejected parole
applications for both Kumar and Louis and they were released only after my
colleagues and I filed habeas corpus petitions in federal court. Gilmer was
lucky; because he was not an arriving alien, he was entitled to a bond hearing
45. DHS will not act on waiver requests until administrative proceedings are final. See U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Svcs., supra note 27.
46. These difficulties are well documented in many reports. See, e.g., AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL USA, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 30-32
(2009), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/uploads/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf, HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON
55-62 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-
detention-report.pdf.
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and was released by an immigration judge after a relatively short time in
detention.
Lawyers representing asylum seekers accused of providing material support
should be prepared to request parole under the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agency's guidelines governing release of arriving asylum seekers
not apprehended at the border or within a certain distance of the border.
47
Under this guidance, DHS should parole an asylum seeker who has passed a
credible fear interview if he establishes his identity and can show that he
"presents neither a flight risk nor danger to the community. '" 8  Lawyers
representing asylum seekers accused of providing material support should pay
particular attention to the definition of "danger to the community," which
includes "activity contrary to U.S. national security interests.
49
It should be obvious that individuals, whose only connection to "terrorist"
groups was as victims (like Kumar, Louis, and Gilmer), cannot reasonably be
considered to have engaged in "activity contrary to U.S. national securit
interests" in any way that would make them a "danger to the community."%
Unfortunately, DHS has often taken the position that, because providing
material support is defined in the statute as "engaging in terrorist activity,
5
the government, regardless of the specific facts of the case, has "reasonable
grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United
,,52States. Any parole request for a client accused of providing material
support should anticipate this argument, and provide facts to demonstrate that
the client presents no danger to the community or to national security. 53
47. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DIRECTIVE No. 11002.1, PAROLE OF
ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE 1.1 (2009),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/pdf/ICE-parole-guidance.pdf.
48. Id. 6.2.
49. Id. 8.3(3).
50. See id.
51. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2006).
52. I.N.A. § 241(b)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) (2006). DHS made this
argument before the BIA in both Louis's and Gilmer's cases. In Gilmer's case, DHS argued that
"[b]y transporting weapons, [Gilmer] provided material support such that [guerrilla] fighters were
able to refuel weaponry and continue bombing and killing individuals. Since [Gilmer] provided
material support to [a terrorist organization] at a time when it was engaged in terrorist activities,
[he] was subject to mandatory detention... " Brief of Petitioner at 6, In re G- L- R- ,
No. A- 529 (B.I.A. July 6, 2009). DHS similarly argued in Louis's case, contending
that Louis engaged in terrorist activities by admittedly providing food and five-thousand francs to
a terrorist organization that he knew was "involved in violent activities" regardless of the fact that
he was attempting to appease the group's repeated demands for money. Brief of Petitioner at 15,
In re L- H- , No. A- - 399 (B.I.A. Apr. 22, 2009).
53. It is worth pointing out that many persons subject to the material-support bar, including
legal, permanent residents seeking naturalization, are not detained even though they meet the
same statutory definition used by DHS to argue against parole for others subject to the bar.
2010]
Catholic University Law Review
Because parole decisions are discretionary determinations not directly
appealable either administratively or judicially,54 often the only option for
release is to file a habeas corpus petition in federal court challenging prolonged
detention. Although the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis held
presumptively unconstitutional any detention after an alien had been ordered
removed from the United States that is longer than six months,55 it has rejected
a habeas corpus challenge to immigration detention during removal
proceedings in Demore v. Kim 6  Nonetheless, the Court's reasoning in
Demore emphasized that the detention of "a limited class of deportable aliens"
who had committed aggravated felonies would have a finite end-date, given
the "limited period" of removal proceedings. 57 Using this reasoning, in 2006
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a successful habeas corpus challenge to prolonged
detention prior to removal of asylum seekers. 58 Although the law is still
undeveloped in this area, a habeas corpus petition can lead to release on parole
before entry of a judicial decision; indeed both Kumar and Louis were released
shortly after filing their habeas corpus petitions.
For those detained asylum seekers eligible for a bond determination by an
immigration judge, DHS may argue, as it did in Gilmer's case, that an alien
accused of providing material support is a "criminal alien" subject to
mandatory detention (and thus ineligible for bond) because he is unable to be
admitted to the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). 59 In response,
the practitioner must be prepared at the bond hearing to present any and all
arguments demonstrating that the material-support bar does not apply.
III. CONCLUSION
Representing an asylum seeker accused of providing material support for
terrorism presents a range of interesting issues for a lawyer, some of which
even the most seasoned immigration court practitioner may not have
Obviously, these persons present no threat to the U.S. despite the fact that DHS categorizes them
as having "engaged in terrorist activity" pursuant to the statute.
54. I.N.A. § 236(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2006).
55. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689-701 (2001) (finding a "serious constitutional
problem arising out of a statute" that "permits an indefinite . . . deprivation of human liberty"
where proceedings are civil and "nonpunitive in purpose and effect"); see Clark v. Martinez, 543
U.S. 371, 378-81 (2005) (applying the statutory interpretation announced in Zadvydas to
inadmissible aliens).
56. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) ("Detention during removal proceedings is a
constitutionally permissible part of that process.").
57. Id. at 517-18, 531.
58. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming a writ of habeas
corpus for an alien who had been detained for five years, reasoning that Demore "endorses the
general proposition of 'brief' detentions, with a specific holding of a six-month period as
presumptively reasonable").
59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(D).
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encountered. Broad DHS interpretations of the material-support bar frequently
raise the issue, and the paucity of BIA or agency guidance gives individual
DHS trial attorneys virtually free rein to fashion arguments to their advantage.
On the other hand, with only a single BIA opinion and no federal appellate
court decisions addressing the material-support bar, a creative lawyer has a fair
chance to make new law.
The excitement of this professional opportunity must, however, be tempered
by the realization that the price of this ongoing intellectual debate is the
abysmal failure of the United States to honor its commitment to those in need
of refugee protection. To refugees like Kumar, Louis, and Gilmer, who are
separated from their families while Washington bureaucrats examine the fine
points of statutory construction, our inability to resolve this statutory morass
comes at far too high a price. The agencies' failure to deal with this issue
expeditiously and responsibly, and the misdirection of resources against relief
for terrorism's victims, also calls into question the efficacy of legitimate
terrorism-prevention efforts.
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